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JOHN E. SULLIVAN*
In the field of charitable trusts the courts are confronted with very
few construction problems which involve large foundations and the
community trusts. The charters of these institutions are generally care-
fully drafted and contain broad purpose clauses which make them flexi-
ble enough to meet the changing time and conditions. Unfortunately
the same cannot be said of all charitable trusts.' Often charitable donors
fail to consider future contingencies with the result that as time passes
it becomes either impossible or impractical to carry out the terms of their
gift.
The Courts are then confronted with the issue of whether the trust
property should be diverted to an analogous charitable undertaking or
returned to the donor or the beneficiaries of his estate.2 The rule of
construction by which many of these charitable gifts are preserved for
the public benefit is known as the Cy Pres Doctrine. It would appear
that courts in this country today are more willing to apply this doctrine
than were courts a century ago.' It is the purpose of this discussion to
consider to what extent the courts of Ohio have accepted and applied
this doctrine.
The term Cy Pres is derived from the French expression cy pres
comme possible-as near as possible.' In the law of trusts it refers
to a rule of construction used by Courts of Equity to affectuate the
intention of a charitable donor "as near as may be", when it would be
impossible or impractical to give literal effect to such intention.5 The
doctrine existed in the Roman law and was adopted by the English
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1 A foundation is a non-government, non-profit organization having a prin-
cipal fund of its own and established to maintain or aid social, educational, chari-
table, or other activities serving the common welfare. ANDREWS, PHILAN-
THROPIC GIVING 90 (1950). Charitable trusts and foundations generally differ
only in legal form. Trusts usually are established by will or inter vivos trust
agreement while foundations are usually chartered by the states as non-profit
membership corporations, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code §§1702.07, 1719.01, 1719.06;
Suspicion on Charitable Foundations, Fortune, (Aug. 1947) 108. A community
trust is a receptacle into which the combined funds of many donors may be placed
for more efficient distribution. Baker, Community Trusts-A New Look In
Charitable Giving, 26 JOURNAL OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 177 (1951).
2 Note, .A Revlaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L. J. 303 (1939).
3 Fisch, Judicial Attitude Towards Cy Pres, 25 TEMP. L. Q. 177 (1950).
The author attributes the change in attitude to changing social and economic
conditions as well as changing philosophies. See Fisch, American Acceptance of
Charitable Trusts, 28 NOTRE DAME LAw. 219 (1953).
42A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §431 (1951).
5 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
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Chancery Courts during the Middle Ages.' The English or common
law doctrine was divided into two divisions usually referred to as the
judicial cy pres and the prerogative cy pres doctrine.,
The prerogative power was exercised by the English chancellors as
part of their duties as ministers of the crown. Under English law the
crown by virtue of its position as parens patriae was privileged to dispose
of charitable property as it wished in two situations:
1. Irhere property was donated for a charitable purpose which
was contrary to the law of the land;
2. In a case where the original charity was vaguely defined as to
its object and purpose, beneficiary and trustee.8
A good example of the former were gifts made to religious societies
which were other than the recognized state religion. The latter situation
arose when gifts were made "for charity generally" without any pro-
visions for a trustee or reference to any particular charitable purpose.9
Judicial Cy Pres was exercised by the Chancellors by virtue of
their authority over charitable trusts as equity judges."0 In 1601 Parlia-
ment enacted the Statute of Charitable Uses which recognized certain
purposes as charitable and provided for the protection of these trusts in
equity." However, there is ample authority that before the statute's
enactment Courts of Equity had exercised jurisdiction over charitable
trusts. 12
The judicial Cy Pres Doctrine is the practice of equity judges
wherein they direct property which has been given to a charitable pur-
pose to another similar purpose in those cases where it has become im-
possible, impractical or inexpedient to carry out the original purpose and
the donor has evinced a general charitable intent. 3
This arbitrary prerogative doctrine was considered contrary to the
American concept of the constitutional guarantee of separation of powers
6 ZOLLMANN, CHARITIES §117, §118 (1924-).
7 2A Bogert, op. cit. supra note 4, §432; Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and
Changi'ng Philosophies, 51 MicH. L. REv. 375, 377 (1953).
84 Scorr, TRUsTS §399.1 (2nd ed. 1956); Note, Charitable Trusts-Def-
nitions and History--Purposes-BeneIciaries-Cy Pres Doctrine, 9 ST. JOHNS L.
REV. 114, 120 (1934).
94 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 8, §399.1; ZOLLMAN, Op. cit. supra note 6, §121.
104 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 8, §399. 1; 2A BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4,
§432; ZOLLMAN, Op. cit. supra note 6, §123.
1143 ELIZ, 1, C. 4 (1601); 4 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 8, §348.2.
12 Ibid.
134 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 8, §399.2; ZOLLMAN Op. cit. supra note 6, §123.
One of the most frequent statements of the doctrine will be found in RESTATEMENT,
TRusrs, §399 (1935). If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular
charitable purpose and it is or becomes impossible or impractical or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general
intention to devote the property to charitable purposes the trust will not fail but
the court will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose
which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.
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between the executive, legislative and judicial branches as well as the
American reverence for private property rights.14 As a result, with
certain qualifications, the prerogative Cy Pres Doctrine was never recog-
nized in Ohio' 5 or other American courts. 6 In fact, it was the failure
on the part of many courts in the United States to grasp the distinction
between the prerogative and judicial function which delayed our
acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of the entire Cy Pres DoctrineY
Today the judicial Cy Pres Doctrine is in force in most American
jurisdictions but there is a lack of uniformity as to the extent to which
it is applied. In most of the states the doctrine has been affirmed by
judicial decision but in some states the doctrine has been legalized by
the legislatures.'
8
One of the earliest cases recognizing the existence of the doctrine
by the Supreme Court of Ohio was in 1835 in Le Clercq v. Town of
Gallipols.?9 Land was set aside by the original settlers as a public
square in the town of Gallipolis. Many years later the legislature
passed a law which permitted the town officials to lease the land and use
the proceeds for river front improvement. Certain citizens who owned
lots adjoining the square sought an injunction to prevent the property
from being converted to any other than a public use. The Court granted
a perpetual injunction but speaking of property donated for public pur-
poses said:
Where circumstances are so changed, that the direction of the
donor prescribing the use, cannot be literally carried into effect,
the legislature or the court, in those cases where general in-
tention can be effected, may lawfully, in some cases, enforce
its execution as nearly as circumstances admit, by the application
of the Doctrine of Cy Pres.2
Four years later in 1839 the Supreme Court decided the first of
the celebrated McIntire cases.21 John McIntire, an original settler of
14 Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 MicH. L. REV.
375, 379-385 (1953).
15 Hunt v. Edgerton, 9 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 353, 19 Ohio C.C. Dec. 377, aff'd.
'without opinion, 75 Ohio St. 594, 80 N.E. 1126 (1906) ; Rea v. Griffin, 21 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 129, 29 Ohio Dec (n.s.) 174, aff'd., Rogers v. Rea, 98 Ohio St. 315, 120 N.E.
828 (1918).
164 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 8, §399.1; ZOLLMAN, op. cit. supra note 6,
§122; Annot. 163 A.L.R. 784, 813. One of the qualifications is that there are
some statements in the cases to the effect that the various state legislatures have
succeeded to this power. Another qualification is that in America, courts have
consistently sustained gifts to charity or for the poor where there is no mention
of a trustee. 2A BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, §4-34.
IT 2A BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 4, §4.33; Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and
Changing Philosophies, 51 MicH. L. Rav. 375, 380; Annot., 163 A.L.R. 784-, 813.
18 4 Scott, op. cit. supra note 8, §399.2.
197 Ohio 218, 28 Am. Dec. 641 (1835).
20 7 Ohio 218, 221, 28 Am. Dec. 641, 643.
21 Trustees of McIntire Poor School v. Zanesville Canal & Mfg. Co., 9 Ohio
203, 34 Am. Dec. 436 (1839).
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the town of Zanesville, had by his will directed that upon the fulfillment
of certain conditions the greater part of his estate should be invested in
the stock of the Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. and that the
income should be used for the establishment and support of a school for
the children of the poor of the town. The will provided that the presi-
dent and directors of the Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co.
should act as trustees for the carrying out of the terms of this trust.
This company had a franchise to construct a dam lock and canal.
The company failed to complete the project in the time allotted by
law and the state legislature passed an act authorizing a purchase of the
company's property by the proper state authorities. Another act was also
passed reciting that since the Zanesville company had ceased to exist and
no one was capable of executing McIntire's trust a corporation of five
trustees should be created to accomplish the wish of the testator. The
new board of trustees filed a bill in equity against the executors of the
estate, the heirs of McIntire who claimed the bequest was void and the
Zanesville company.
The court was faced with two issues-whether the will of McIntire
created a valid charitable trust and whether the new trustees appointed
by the act of the legislature were the proper parties to execute it. The
Court held that the -bequest created a valid charitable trust but that the
original trustees were the proper parties to execute it because The Zanes-
ville Co. still had a legal existence and that the appointment of the new
trustees was void with the result that the Zanesville Co. still had the
right, through its officers, to carry out the terms of the gift.
The scope of the doctrine of Cy Pres was argued at great length
by counsel in the case but as the court sustained the original trust, it did
not expressly mention Cy Pres in its opinion. The importance of this
decision was that it established that equity courts in Ohio had jurisdiction
over charitable trusts by reason of the court's inherent authority which
is independent of the statute of charitable uses or any prerogative power
of the state.22
The same liberal attitude toward the interpretation of charitable
bequests was shown by the court in 1851 in the second Mclntire case
23
where the Supreme Court held that the benefits of this trust were not
limited to the children of the poor residing in the corporate limits of
the town as they existed at the death of McIntire but also included poor
children residing in the territory which had been added to the town since
229 Ohio 287, 34 Am. Dec. 438 (1839). But without reference to these
considerations, where a trust is plainly defined, and a trustee exists, capable of
holding the property and executing the trust, it has never been doubted that
chancery has jurisdiction over it, by its own inherent authority; not derived by
the statute, nor resulting from its functions as parens patria accord. Urmey's Ex'rs
v. Levi Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160, 59 Am. Dec. 615 (1853) ; Palmer v. Oiler, 102
Ohio St. 271, 131 N.E. 362 (1921).
23 The Zanesville Canal & Manufacturing Co. v. City of Zanesville, 20 Ohio
483 (1851).
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his death. By this decision the court believed it was carrying out the real
intention of the testator, because most of the poor, unlike the modern
suburbia at that time, lived in the circumference area of the expanded
city. To hold otherwise, it was felt, would defeat his purpose. The court
did not expressly mention Cy Pres but certainly they were effecting a
more efficent distribution of his funds in light of changing circumstances.
The last case involving the Mclntire fund reached the Supreme
Court in 1867.24 The court reaffirmed the principle of the previous case
but was also faced with two new issues. The stock of the Zanesville Co.,
which was now defunct, could not be purchased and, if it were obtained,
it was valueless. Therefore, it was argued successfully by the trustees
that it was both impossible and impractical to invest the fund in this
stock. The court directed them to invest the funds in other safe and
productive channels. Since this related to the administration of trust
funds rather than altering the purpose it could hardly be based on the
Cy Pres Doctrine.
The other issue presented by the passing of time was that after the
death of McIntire the State inaugurated a system of public schools which
were supported by general taxation and in which the children of rich as
well as the poor were given a free education. This had created a certain
repugnance on the part of parents and children toward a distinctive
"Poor School." The trustees had turned the McIntire School building
over to the local school board and were paying expenses of this school
as well as another school in the city. There were still many children
in the city of indigent parents who did not avail themselves of the public
schools because they could not afford proper clothing, books and school
items. The trustees had a surplus and asked directions for its application.
The court found that the general intention of McIntire was the
education of the poor children of Zanesville. It held that the establish-
ment and maintenance of a school was a mere means to that end and
this means having become impractical, the trustees might resort to other
means to effect the general intention of the testator. In this new nodus
operandi it included books, clothing and even food as well as higher
education. However, it did not include the use of the fund to aid the
public school system because this would benefit both rich and poor
children, and would merely have the effect of lightening the tax burden.
Although the court did not mention Cy Pres by name, it was clearly
referring to it when speaking of the changed condition it said:
Is the object of the charity exhausted and must the fund
be paid over to the heirs of the donor? We think not. We
must look deeper than the mere words of this donation and
through them see its spirit. We must inquire what the donor
himself would now direct, had he lived to witness the present
altered circumstances of the case.25
24 Mclntire's Adm'r and the Zanesville Canal & Manufacturing Co. v. City
of Zanesville, 17 Ohio St. 352 (1867).
2 5 Id. at 363.
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However, the next year the court with the same membership held
that the doctrine of Cy Pres did not apply in the case of the Board of
Education of the Incorporated Village of Van Wert v. Inhabitants of
the Town of Van Wert.2' Two specific lots in the city of Van Wert
were dedicated by the original proprietors "for school purposes on which
to erect school houses." With the passing of time the two lots became
unsuitable for such purposes because of their close proximity to a rail-
road. The school authorities sought to sell the lots and apply the pro-
ceeds for the purchase of new sites. They claimed that by an applicable
state school statute they were authorized to sell the real estate. The
court held that the statute only applied to cases where the absolute owner-
ship of the school property was vested in the public authorities and did
not apply to a case where the original proprietors dedicated particular lots
for a specific use.2 1 Cy Pres was held inapplicable in such a case and
the property was held to revert to the heirs of the dedicators. The
opinion cited Le Clercq v. Town, of Gallipolis with approval.
By 1924 the three Mclntire cases, The Board of Education of the
Incorporated Village of Van Wert v. Inhabitants of the Town of
Van W'Vert, and Le Clercq v. Town of Gallipolis were the important
Supreme Court authority in Ohio for the existence of the Doctrine.28
The Mclntire cases did not mention it by name and the latter two held
that it was inapplicable to the solution of the particular cases. However,
during the years and especially after the turn of the century the Doctrine
was referred to and in certain instances applied by lower courts in the
state.
29
An important decision in this field of law was Gerhart v. Richard-
son in 1924."° A testator had left his farm house in trust as a home for
the aged and destitute of his township. Sufficient funds were not pro-
vided with which to operate the home. Although again the Doctrine un-
fortunately was not mentioned by name, the court in executing what
they considered the general charitable intention of the testator permitted
26 18 Ohio St. 221, 98 Am. Dec. 114 (1868).
27 The case was subsequently overruled by the case of Babin v. City of
Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E. 2d 580 (1953) in so far as the case attempted
to limit local authorities on the selling of land conveyed in fee for a specific use
on the cessation of such use.
28 Deibel, Supreme Court Discards Cy Pres Doctrine, 20 Ohio L. Rep. 237
(1923) ; Patterson, Dirlam v. Morrow tfras Rightly Decided, 20 Ohio L. Rep. 321,
328 (1923).
20 Graham v. Bergin, 18 Ohio App. 35 (1923); Proctor v. Mathers, 17 Ohio
App. 118, 21 Ohio L. Rep. 492 (1922) ; Rockwell v. Blaney, 9 Ohio N. P. (n.s.)
495, 498, 22 Ohio Dec. 107, 110 (1910) ; First German Reformed Church v.
Weikel, 7 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377, 19 Ohio Dec. 239 (1908) ; Harper v. Central
Trust Co., 8 Ohio N. P. 157, 11 Ohio Dec. 240 (1901). See City of Cincinnati v.
McMicken, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 188, 3 Ohio C.C. Dec. 409, affirmed without opinion, 29
Ohio Weekly Law Bulletin 168 (1892).
3o 109 Ohio St. 418, 142 N.E. 890 (1924).
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the trustees to rent the farm and apply the proceeds to the aged and
poor. It is unfortunate here as well as in the Mclntire cases that the
court did not see fit to mention Cy Pres because they thereby opened the
door to the confusion which was later to come between the Doctrine of
Cy Pres and the Doctrine of Deviation.
For some unknown reason very few Cy Pres cases reach the Su-
preme Court and therefore most statements of the doctrine have ap-
peared in lower court opinions. Ohio courts seem to follow the tradi-
tional view that before the Cy Pres Doctrine will be applied by a court
these three essentials must be present:3 ' (1) There must be a valid chari-
table trust and one that is invalid will not be cured by an application of
the Doctrine; 2 (2) It must be established that it is impossible or im-
practical to carry out the specific purpose of the trust; (3) It must be
established that the donor evinced a general charitable intent.33
In meeting the first requisite charitable trusts are aided by the
principle that the courts of this state are committeed to a liberal inter-
pretation of such trust instruments.3 4 In the above-mentioned McIntire
cases Ohio has enforced charitable bequests for educational institutions.
Other Ohio decisions have sustained such charitable purposes as the case
of orphans,35 the religious advancement of the living,3" the appropriation
of land for the burial of the dead" and gifts which seek to relieve
poverty and destitution.
38
It is of the nature of a charitable trust that the beneficiaries must
be of a large and sufficiently indefinite class because it is axiomatic that
the law does not consider gifts to particular individuals as charitable.
3 9
3 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, §399 (1935).
32 Dirlam Executor v. Morrow, 102 Ohio St. 279, 131 N.E. 365 (1921)
discussed below. See Collings v. Davis, 17 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 221, 24 Ohio C.C.
Dec. 84 (1911). Deibel, supra note 28, at 244. 2A BoGaRT, TRUST AND TRUSTEES,
§431 (1951).
33 Mclntire's Adm'r and The Zanesville Canal & Manufacturing Co. v. City
of Zanesville, 17 Ohio St. 352 (1867) discussed previously. Craft v. Shroyer,
81 Ohio App. 253, 74 N.E. 2d 589 (1947) ; Heinlein v. Elyria Savings & Trust Co.,
75 Ohio App. 353, 62 N.E. 2d 284 (1945); Allen Adm'r. v. City of Bellefontaine,
47 Ohio App. 359, 191 N.E. 896 (1934); Ward v. 'Worthington, 28 Ohio App. 325,
162 N.E. 714 (1928) ; Murr v. Youse, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 80 N.E. 2d 788 (1946)
all discussed below.
34 Gearheart v. Richardson, 109 Ohio St. 418, 142 N.E. 890 (1924); Palmer
v. Oiler, 102 Ohio St. 271, 131 N.E. 362 (1921); Sowers v. Cyrenius, 39 Ohio St.
29, 48 Am. Rep. 48 (1883) ; Urmey's Executors v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160, 59 Am.
Dec. 615 (1853) ; 9 Ohio Jur. 2d Charities §44 (1954).
35 Urmey's Exrs. v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160, 59 Am. Dec. 615 (1853).
36 Williams v. Society of Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 478 (1852) ; Miller v.
Teachout, 24 Ohio St. 525 (1874) ; Sowers v. Cyrenius, 39 Ohio St. 29, 48 Am. Rep.
418 (1883).
37 Hullman v. Honcomp, 5 Ohio St. 238 (1855).
38 Gearhart v. Richardson, 109 Ohio St. 418, 142 N.E. 890 (1924).
3 9 In Re Estate of Salisbury, 90 Ohio App. 17, 101 N.E. 2d 304 (1951) ; See
Eagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F. 2d 881 (5th Cir. 1930).
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As a result charitable trusts by their nature must contain a certain degree
of vagueness while at the same time they must be sufficiently definite as
to their purposes and beneficiaries so that a court is able to enforce their
terms.
Whether a particular trust meets such almost contradictory tests
depends upon the peculiar facts of each individual case.4" In Palmer v.
Oiler4 1 the Supreme Court upheld as valid a residuary clause of a will
which provided: "The residue of my estate I give to the Cleveland
Trust Company to be devoted to the needy and poor women." But on
the very same day in the case of Dirlam Ex'r. v. Morrow42 the court in
a per curiam opinion with one judge dissenting held the following
residuary clause invalid as too vaguely defined:
To the First Congregational Church of Mansfield, Ohio and
the Mayflower Memorial Congregational Church of Mans-
field, Ohio, as residuary legatees of my estate I bequeath the
remainder of my estate and all my real estate ...the income
to be used for religious and philanthropic work in Mansfield,
Ohio, especially among children and young people promoting
among them Christian living the fruit of the spirit as shown
in Galatians, Chap. 5, Verse 22, total abstinence from strong
drink and tobacco in all forms, rules of health, thrift and
economy.
The clause then contained a complicated procedure for the selection
of the trustees of the fund and a separate clause gave certain of the
testatrix's relatives a right of homestead in the real property devised.
The court stated that this latter provision accentuated the illegality of
the bequest.
However, other Ohio cases have sustained mixed gifts for private
and charitable purposes.4" A Court of Appeals stated that the fusion of
a charitable trust with a trust of a private nature does not render the
charitable trust invalid as long as the two gifts are separable and that
in Dirlam Ex'r. v. Morrow the court was simply dealing with an invalid
trust.
44
The court in the Morrow case did not discuss the application of the
Cy Pres Doctrine apparently in keeping with the rule that Cy Pres can-
not be used to cure an invalid charitable trust.
Yet it is difficult to reconcile the Morrow case with Palmer v.
Oiler on the issue of uncertainty and other Ohio cases have sustained
charitable gifts almost as vague.43 It would seem that the testatrix here
40 Edgeter v. Kemper, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 297, 305 (1955).
41 102 Ohio St. 271, 131 N.E. 362 (1921).
42102 Ohio St. 279, 131 N.E. 365 (1921).
43 Miller v. Teachout, 24 Ohio St. 525 (1874) ; Graham v. Bergin, 18 Ohio
App. 35 (1923).
4418 Ohio App. 35, 41 (1923).
45 Sowers v. Cyrenius, 39 Ohio 29, 48 Am. Rep. 418 (1883) ; Miller v.
Teachout, 24 Ohio St. 525 (1874) ; Urmey's Executors v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160,
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had a general charitable intent, namely to aid in the spiritual and moral
development of young people in Mansfield and though the method of
thus achieving this end was faulty it would appear that the court would
not have been extending the law of Ohio if they had sustained the gift
and then applied the Cy Pres Doctrine. 46
In regard to the second requirement for the application of the
doctrine, that it is impractical or impossible to carry out the specific pur-
pose of the donor, Ohio law is not clear. One noted authority states
that Cy Pres should be applicable where it is impractical to carry out the
terms of the trust even though it is possible to do so.47 This was the
view followed by a lower court in the case of Harper v. Central Trust
Co.48 Several citizens contributed to a trust fund providing for the
support of a mother of a National Guardsman killed while involved in
riot duty, and also for the support of dependent relatives of any
member "who might lose his life in the performance of assigned military
duties." Seventeen years passed without a similar occurence. The court
in applying the Cy Pres Doctrine and allowing the funds to be used for
the benefit of three guardsmen injured in the same riot admitted that
the object of the trust had not entirely failed. It was held that it was
still possible that in the future some member might lose his life on
assigned military duty. But the court said:
Neither is it necessary that the object of the trust should cease
to exist, or that the expressed trust should become absolutely
impossible of application before the Doctrine of Cy Pres can
be invoked.
The best considered English authorities seem to hold that it is
sufficient if it is highly improbable that the circumstances will
arise calling for the application of the trust, and that the
question of probability is one appealing largely to the judg-
ment and discretion of the chancellor.49
However a more conservative approach to the extent of judicial
discretion on the issue of impracticality was displayed by another Ohio
court in Heinlein v. Elyria Savings & Trust Co.50 In holding that funds
which were willed by a testator for the establishment of two public parks
on designated sites could not be used for the maintenance of another
older park and quoting 10 AM. JUR., Charities, §124 with approval, it
stated:
• . . There can be no question of Cy Pres until it is clearly
established that the directions of the testator cannot be carried
into effect. Therefore, a court of equity is not entitled to
substitute a different scheme for the scheme which the donor
59 Am. Dec. 615 (1853). A collection of such cases will be found in the Ohio
Annotations to the RESTATEMENT, TRusTs, §364 (1939).
46 Deibel, op. cit. supra note 28.
474 ScoTw, TRusTs, §399.4 (2nd ed. 1956).
48 8 Ohio N. P. 157, 11 Ohio Dec. 240 (1901).
49 8 Ohio N. P. 157, 159, 11 Ohio Dec. 240, 243 (1901).
50 75 Ohio App. 353, 62 N.E. 2d 284 (1945).
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has prescribed in the instrument which creates the charity,
merely because a coldly wise intelligence, impervious to the
special predilections which inspired his liberality and un-
trammeled by his directions, would have dictated a different use
of his money.
51
A survey of Ohio decisions would show that the specific purpose
of a donor may fail for many reasons: the fund may be excessive52 or
insufficient 3 for the particular purpose; the particular purpose may
already have been accomplished at the time the gift is to take effect; 5 4
the charity that is to receive the gift ceases to exist or never existed; 55
the property donated is unsuitable for the purpose which it is given;5 G
the gift is subject to a condition precedent requiring action of a third
party who fails to act."7
With the exception of one case which involved the distribution of
excessive funds5 s and a federal court case 9 wherein the court refused
to apply Cy Pres to an Ohio charitable trust where the impossibility of
the donor's purpose occurred as a result of the action of the trustees
themselves, whether a Ohio court will apply Cy Pres in one of the above
situations depends on whether the donor gave evidence of a general
charitable intention.
This third requirement for the application of the Doctrine is sub-
ject to much criticism. In meeting this requirement courts seek to deter-
mine whether a donor intended that his property was to be applied to
charity in any event or only if such application could be applied in the
particular manner specified in his trust instrument. The general charita-
ble intention concept is based on the idea that in applying Cy Pres a
51 75 Ohio App. 353, 363, 62 N.E. 2d 284, 289 (1945).
52A case involving excessive funds where Cy Pres has been applied: First
German Reformed Church v. Weikel, 7 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377, 19 Ohio Dec. 239
(1908). Contra, Collings v. Davis, 17 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 221, 24 Ohio C.C. Dec. 84
(1911), aff'd. ,without opinion, 87 Ohio St. 504 (1912).
53 Gearhart v. Richardson, 109 Ohio St. 418, 142 N.E. 890 (1924) ; Graham
v. Bergin, 18 Ohio App. 35 (1923); Allen v. City of Bellefontaine, 47 Ohio App.
359, 191 N.E. 896 (1934).
54 In Matter of Distribution of Y.M.C.A. War Fund, 63 Ohio App. 213, 25
N.E. 2d 956 (1939) ; Niles Post No. 2074 of the Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Niles
Memorial Hospital Assn., 65 Ohio App. 238, 29 N.E. 2d 631 (1936) ; Procter v.
Mathers, 17 Ohio App. 118, 21 Ohio L. Rep. 492 (1922); Hall v. Asbaugh, 4 Ohio
L. Abs. 70 (1925); Murr v. Youse, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 80 N.E. 2d 788 (1946).
55 Vard v. Worthington, 28 Ohio App. 325, 162 N.E. 714 (1928); Bowen
Adm'r. v. Kollar, 18 Ohio App. 10, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 470 (1923) ; Rockwell v. Blaney,
9 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 495, 22 Ohio Dec. 107 (1910).
56 Board of Education of Incorporated Village of Van Wert v. Inhabitants
of Town of Van Wert, 18 Ohio St. 221, 98 Am. Dec. 114 (1868); Cincinnati v.
McMicken, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 188, 3 Ohio C.C. Dec. 409, aff'd. without opinion, 29
Ohio Weekly Law Bulletin 168 (1892).
57 Allen v. City of Bellefontaine, 47 Ohio App. 359, 191 N.E. 896 (1934).
i Collings v. Davis, 17 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 221, 24 Ohio C.C. Dec. 84,
aff'd. 'without opinion, 87 Ohio St. 504 (1911).
:; Harvard College v. Jewett, 11 F. 2d 119 (6th Cir. 1925).
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court is really carrying out a secondary intent of the donor. As one
authority points out most donors probably never considered that their
plans might fail and courts are really applying or refusing to apply the
doctrine based upon their own subjective viewpoint as to the social utility
of the particular gift.6"
In the City of Cincinnati v. McMicken,6" a testator bequeathed real
estate in the City of Cincinnati for the establishment of what is now
the University of Cincinnati. Changing times made the particular site
unsuitable for a University. The court in permitting the removal of
the University to another location found that the general intention of
the testator was the establishment of such an institution and that he did
not make his gift dependent upon the particular site. The court indicated
that what it was really attempting was to carry out a secondary intention
of the testator.
There is one type of charitable trust where Ohio courts, with one
exception, 62 apparently always have found that there was a charitable
intent on the part of the donor. Every one of these cases arose con-
cerning funds which were raised by popular subscriptions during the
first World War for the relief of servicemen. As far as such funds
are concerned the court could hardly in most cases require that the
money be returned to the original donors because the donors are often
too numerous and in most cases are unknown.6" The courts might have
held that this property should escheat to the State on the cessation of
hostilities but no case has so held. 4 In most of these cases the funds
were either turned over to local veterans organizations or to trustees
appointed -by the courts to construct war memorials or to assist in the
work of veterans' rehabilitation.
In some cases courts have considered conditions at the time of the
making of the will as well as the specific language which was used in
arriving at the decision that the testator evinced a narrow charitable in-
tention: In Bowen, Adm'r. v. Kollar,5 a testator left funds to the
"Old Folks Home" for men in Kansas City. There was no such in-
60 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §436 (1951).
61 6 Ohio C.C.R. 188, 3 Ohio C.C. Dec. 409, aff'd. without opinion, 29 Ohio.
Weekly Law Bulletin 168 (1892). Compare BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 60, §436;
Carr v. Lane Seminary, 5 Ohio Op. 272, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 107, affrd., 5 Ohio,
Op. 283, mod. on rehearing, 5 Ohio Op. 283 (1936).
62American Legion v. Hospital Assn., 11 Ohio L. Abs. 133 (1931) a case
where the donors were known and they were asked whether they wished their
donations returned or not.
63 In Matter of Distribution of Y.M.C.A. War Fund, 63 Ohio App. 213,
25 N.E. 2d 956 (1939) ; Niles Post No. 2074 of the Veterans of Foreign Wars v.
Niles Memorial Hospital Assn., 65 Ohio App. 238, 29 N.E. 2d 631 (1936) ; Procter
v. Mathers, 17 Ohio App. 118, 21 Ohio L. Rep. 492 (1922); Hall v. Asbaugh,
4 Ohio L. Abs. 70 (1925).
64 Comment, Cy Pres Doctrine and Anonymous Donors, 6 STAN. L. REv. 729
(1954).
65 18 Ohio App. 10, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 470 (1923).
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stitution exclusively for men in existence in that city either at the time
of the execution of the will or the death of the testator. The court re-
fused to find an intention to aid the aged in general and pointed out
that an unhappy marriage in the testator's life probably influenced the
testator's language in limiting his gift to men. Similarly in Allen ddm'r.
v. Bellefontaine0 a testatrix left funds for the establishment of a private
lying-in hospital and research center to be used by local physicians who
were to supply additional funds to the trust. Literal execution of this
trust was impossible. The court held that there was no intention to aid
the sick in general and funds could not be applied to aid another hospital.
The court calls attention to the fact that the testatrix knew of the other
hospital at the time of the execution of her will and it appeared she
intended to establish a different type of institution.
In two other cases specific language used in the will also influenced
courts in finding that the testator's intent was narrow. In Murr v.
Youse"' a testator left a fund for the erection of a library building
which was to bear his name. At the time the gift was to be executed the
town had adequate library facilities. The court found that it would be
impractical to carry out the testator's gift but refused to apply Cy Pres
to the funds because of a lack of a general charitable intent. His pur-
pose according to the court was to have a library building erected on a
designated site which was to bear his name and not to aid library work
in general. In Ward v. Worthington6" a testatrix gave her home to a
church to be used as a parsonage. The will provided that portraits of
certain of her relatives should remain in the residence. At the time of
her death the church was no longer in existence and the testatrix's title
in the home was only an undivided half interest. The residence was
sold and the court again refused to apply Cy Pres to her half of the
proceeds because of the lack of a general charitable intent. The pro-
vision as to the portraits helped the court to reach this conclusion.
A survey of Ohio decision reveals that in recent years Ohio courts
are attempting to circumvent this third requirement by applying what is
known as the Doctrine of Deviation. This doctrine is often justifiably
confused with the Doctrine of Cy Pres. The chief difference is that the
former doctrine applies in the field of private as well as charitable trusts
and it is important to note that under it a court is not required to find a
general charitable intent. 9 In ordering a deviation the court does not
touch the purpose or object of the trust but merely permits a deviation
from the terms of the trust in matters which relate to its administration.7"
In the First National Bank of Akron V. The Unknown Heirs of
0647 Ohio App. 359, 191 N.E. 896 (1934).
67 52 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 80 N.E. 2d 788 (1946).
0828 Ohio App. 325, 162 N.E. 714 (1928).
09 Craft, Ex'r. v. Shroyer, S1 Ohio App. 253, 273, 74 N.E. 2d 589, 598 (1947).
704 Scorr, TRUSTS q399 (2nd ed. 1956).
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Donnelly" the testator authorized his trustee to use the trust funds for
the support of a Catholic Orphanage in Summit County and if there
were none to establish this type of institution. Summit County did not
have a Catholic orphanage and the trust funds were insufficient to estab-
lish one. The court ordered the trustees to use the funds for the care
and support of Summit County orphans in the nearby Catholic orphanage
of Cuyahoga County. The court stated that it did not decide whether
the doctrine of Cy Pres would apply but suggested that part of the
confusion that exists between the two concepts is that in certain cases
both rules could be applied.
Similarly in Craft Exr. v. Shoyer72 a testatrix left her entire estate
to establish an orphanage for full orphans of the United Lutheran
Church of Miami County, Ohio. It was admitted that it was impractical
and inexpedient to carry out the specific terms of the trust. The court
refused to find a general intention to aid orphans here because of the
specific language of the will but they ordered the trustees to use the
funds for the care, maintenance and support of Miami County orphans
during their residence at a neighboring United Lutheran Orphanage in
Springfield.
In another recent case the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County permitted the income from certain trust funds that had been
created for the support of the Cleveland Art Museum to be used for a
limited time to help construct the physical plant of the Museum. 73
From the results which are sought to be achieved by the decrees in
these three cases it would be hard indeed to distinguish the Doctrine of
Deviation from Cy Pres. In Findley v. The City of Conneaut74 the Ohio
Supreme Court placed a limitation on both the Doctrine of Cy Pres and
the Doctrine of Deviation. A testator devised the residue of his estate to a
trustee for the purpose of establishing an industrial school in Conneaut,
Ohio if that city accepted certain conditions of the testator. Conneaut
did not accept the offer. The will provided in that event that the same
offer was to be made to the Village of Geneva. If neither municipality
accepted the offer or met the conditions of the testator the trustee was
to establish the school himself or give the money to an established school.
In a declaratory judgment action brought by the trustee to determine
the rights of the parties the Village of Geneva sought relief from one
of the conditions, viz., that the accepting community provide a mainte-
nance fund for the school which would yield five thousand dollars a
year. Geneva argued that since the trust funds had increased from two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars to almost nine hundred thousand
dollars they should be relieved of this requirement and that the extra
money now in the fund be used for this purpose. The Court refused
7196 Ohio App. 509, 122 N.E. 2d 672 (1954).
72 81 Ohio App. 253, 74 N.E. 2d 589 (1947).
73 Cleveland Museum of Art v. O'Neill, 57 Ohio Op. 250 (1955).
74 145 Ohio St. 480, 62 N.E. 2d 318 (1945).
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to apply the Doctrine of Deviation to relieve Geneva of this require-
ment. The Court said that deviation is used only to prevent the failure
of the purpose of a charitable trust. But here the testator had provided
for alternative plans under either of which his purposes could be ac-
complished. The court stated that neither Cy Pres nor deviation is
applied to cases where a testator has provided alternate plans to carry out
the purposes of his trust and one of them is legal and possible.
7 5
This rule should supply the key to the drafters of charitable trusts.
If a client wishes to establish a charitable trust, the attorney should
frankly inform him of the possibility that changing times and conditions
may render his particular purpose impracticable or impossible of accom-
plishment. If his client in this event wishes the property to revert to
him or his successors the instrument should so state but if the client
wishes the property to be perpetually devoted to charitable uses there
are two possibilities open to the attorney.
The trust instrument may contain a provision whereby if the origi-
nal plan fails the trustee is permitted to modify the trust or apply the
income to new charitable needs. In this manner court action to modify
the trust is eliminated. If this provision is not inserted court action will
be necessary because Cy Pres is a power of equity courts alone.
76
Probably the best suggestion in many of the cases is for the attorney
to call to the client's attention the feasibility of leaving the funds in
the hands of his local community foundation. These institutions ad-
minister many separate charitable funds which may meet the donor's
purpose and they also give their trustees wide powers to meet changing
times and conditions. In fact it has been the hesitancy of many courts




Ohio has adopted the general principles of the Cy Pres Doctrine.
Most of the cases where the court refers to the doctrine are lower court
decisions. In this state the Doctrine is of judicial origin as the prerogative
power has never been recognized. Before the doctrine is applied the
court must establish that a charitable trust is involved. The purpose
of the trust must be impractical or impossible and the testator must
have evinced a general charitable intent. The latter requirement is
avoided in some recent cases by the application by the courts of an
analogous theory from the field of private trusts which is known as
the Doctrine of Deviation. Most of the problems in this area can be
avoided by the attorney who ascertains the real objectives of his client
and clearly so states the intention of his client in the trust instrument.
75 For additional litigation in this matter see Kingdom v. Record, 72 Ohio
L. Abs. 249, 133 N.E. 2d 921 (1954).
7 6 2A BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 60, §435.
7 7 Lomis, COMMUNITY TRUSTS OF AIERICA, 1914-1951, 51 et seq. (1950);
Baker, Community Trusts, 26 JOURNAL OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 177, 179;
Report for 1951, The New York Community Trust p. 1-6.
